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1Optimization for Maximizing Sum Secrecy Rate in
MU-MISO SWIPT Systems
Mahmoud Alageli, Aissa Ikhlef, Member, IEEE, and Jonathon Chambers, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, we consider the sum secrecy rate maxi-
mization problem in multiuser multiple-input single-output (MU-
MISO) systems in the presence of multiple energy harvesters
(EHs) which also have potential to wire-tap the information users
(IUs). To facilitate delivering secure information to the IUs and
increase the total harvested energy by the EHs simultaneously,
we optimise the transmit beamforming vectors to direct the
information signals toward the IUs and artificial noise (AN)
toward the EHs. We assume that each EH relies on itself
to decode the information signal intended for an individual
IU. Therefore, the corresponding problem is to maximize the
worst-case sum secrecy rate under transmit power and energy
harvesting constraints. The problem is optimally solved by
transforming it into a convex iterative program using a change
of variables, semi-definite relaxation (SDR) and linearization of
quadratic terms. We prove that rank-one optimal solutions for
the IUs beamforming covariance matrices can be obtained from
the optimal relaxed unconstrained solution. Also, we provide
three sub-optimal solutions based on null space projection and
power control of the beamforming vectors for the low and
high harvested energy constrained regions. A special case of
cooperative EHs in which the EHs can collaboratively cancel
the signal of all IUs except the one they intend to eavesdrop
is also investigated, and the optimal solution is derived in a
comparable way as in non-cooperative EHs case. Our simulation
results reveal an understanding of how the trade-off between the
AN and information signal can jointly improve both the sum
secrecy rate and the total harvested energy. We also show that,
within the low total harvested energy region, the sub-optimal
solution in which the AN is projected in the null space of the IUs
channels outperforms the sub-optimal solution which ignores AN
alignment at the IUs, and vice versa over the high total harvested
energy region; and that the suboptimal solution that combines
both of them achieves close to optimal performance.
Index Terms—SWIPT, multiuser multi-input single-output
(MU-MISO), physical-layer security, sum secrecy rate, energy
harvesting, beamforming, artificial noise
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the technologies for extending the lifetime of
energy constrained wireless networks such as wireless sensor
networks have acquired much interest. Wireless power transfer
(WPT) is a reliable method for powering remote wireless
nodes. The concept of WPT was first introduced by Tesla a
century ago [1], since then, a large number of studies have
been conducted on WPT for short and medium distances
which are mainly based on inductive and magnetic resonance
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coupling techniques [2]–[4]. However, having tightly coupled
aligned devices at short proximity seems to be unattainable
in practice. One of the latest promising technologies is that
based on utilizing the radio frequency (RF) transmission for si-
multaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT).
A growing body of research has recognised the importance
of employing SWIPT technology for multiuser multi-input
single-output (MU-MISO) systems [5]–[15] in which there
are some users interested in information decoding (IUs) while
others wish to perform energy harvesting (EHs). Due to the
nature of the broadcast channel and the common practice
that the EHs are assumed to be in close proximity to the
transmitting antennas compared to the IUs, the implementation
of SWIPT faces a security challenge in canceling the crosstalk
between IUs and EHs.
The earliest information protection approaches in
MISO/MIMO wireless network were typically information-
theoretic based such as cryptography techniques attained
by applying encryption at the upper protocol layer [16].
The robustness of cryptography techniques relies on the
computational hardness required to recover the encryption
key, however, such security techniques are not protected
against the advances in quantum computing [17]. Although
some research works have considered exploiting the
reciprocity and randomness of the channel between the
transmitter and the IU for secrecy key generation [18]–[21],
extra resources are required to secure a wireless channel
to share the encryption key between the transmitter at the
base station (BS) and the IU, and this is quite difficult in
SWIPT with the presence of multiple IUs and EHs which
can potentially play the role of eavesdropper.
Latterly, physical layer security (PHY-security) has proven
to be a promising alternative to the information-theoretic
security techniques. It exploits the knowledge of the transmit
channel to provide a better signal quality at the IUs compared
to that at the EHs using signal beamforming and jamming
techniques. In transmit beamforming, the transmitted signal is
precoded in order to strengthen the information signal power
at the IUs and to direct artificial noise (AN) toward the
EHs. Previous works [7]–[10] have considered the maximiza-
tion of downlink secrecy rate under certain harvested energy
constraints, or as a by-product, the minimization of transmit
power under some secrecy rate constraints. For example,
the authors in [8] considered a system comprising a single-
antenna IU and multiple single-antenna EHs which collude
to cooperatively decode the information signal of the IU.
The objective was to optimize the information and the AN
beamforming vectors to maximize the secrecy rate subject
2to individual harvested energy constraints, or to minimize
the total transmit power subject to secrecy rate and energy
harvesting constraints. The work in [9] assumed that each IU
employs a power splitting approach to decode information and
harvest energy simultaneously and each user is cooperatively
wire-taped by the remaining IUs. The considered problem
was to minimize the total transmit power under constraints
on individual harvested energy and secrecy rate. In [10], the
problem was to maximize the minimum secrecy rate of an
IU and EH pair under constraints on minimum individual
harvested energy by the IUs and EHs. EHs are passive which
means they can either harvest energy or decode information
at a time, whereas the IUs employ power splitting for SWIPT.
Cooperative jamming techniques have also been considered
for PHY-security [12]–[15]. In [12], the secrecy rate of the
intended user was improved by employing a cooperative jam-
mer (CJ) which generates AN toward a single eavesdropper to
assist in degrading its information signal quality and supply the
EH and IU with wireless power. The problem of maximizing
the secrecy rate for the worst-case channel uncertainties and
under transmit power constraints and EH constraints was
decoupled into three problems and solved alternately.
SWIPT has also been considered for the frequency selective
environment [22]–[25]. The authors in [22] used orthogonal
frequency division multiplexing access (OFDMA) to address
the maximization of the harvested energy of a single eaves-
dropper while maintaining the minimum individual secrecy
rate requirements of legitimate users by alternately optimizing
subcarrier allocation and power splitting ratio at the legitimate
users.
In the earlier works [6], [8], the authors considered similar
system models to the multiple IUs model considered in this
paper, but for a single IU and multiple EHs in [6] and for a
single IU and colluding eavesdroppers in [8]. The objective
function for secrecy rate maximization in [6] was a difference
between two logarithms of linear fractional functions which
correspond to the IU’s information rate and the information
rate at the worst EH. The problem was solved by one-
dimentional search through a set of optimised IU’s signal-
to-noise ratios (SNRs) which correspond to a set of common
upper bound constraints on the SNR at the EHs. The linear
fractional objective function was convexified by semi-definite
relaxation (SDR) and the Charnes-Cooper transformation. The
same methods were applied in [8] but for colluding eavesdrop-
pers and imperfect channel state information (CSI). However,
considering multiple IUs (for sum secrecy rate maximization)
will result in a non-linear fractional objective function which
inevitably can not be optimally solved by the method for
a single IU used in [6] due to the non-linearity of the
fractional objective function, and this leads to a completely
different optimization challenge. Another issue of considering
multiple IUs compared to a single IU model in [6] is that
the dimensionality of the null space of the IUs channel matrix
decreases as the number of IUs increases, i.e., the column size
of null(H) ∈ CN×N−M decreases as M increases, where H
is the channel matrix of the IUs and M is the number of IUs.
Therefore, any further beamforming using null(H) will lose
the gain of M coefficients.
In this work, an MISO SWIPT system comprising multiple
IUs and multiple EHs is considered. We employ transmit
beamforming for the information signal and the AN to max-
imize the worst-case sum secrecy rate of the IUs and the
sum secrecy rate for the case of cooperative EHs with a
lower limit on the total harvested energy by the EHs (the
problem with individual harvested energy constraints has also
been considered). To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this
problem has not been considered in the literature before. More
precisely, we provide optimal solutions based on a semidefi-
nite programming (SDP) formulation. Using dual multipliers
which satisfy Slater’s condition [26] and the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions of the SDP problem, we derive a
rank-one optimal solution which achieves the same objective
value as the optimal rank-unconstrained solution. In addition,
we provide two different sub-optimal solutions for the low
and high harvested energy constraint regions based on null
space projection (NSP) of the beamforming vectors with
per beamforming vector power control. By employing both
AN beamforming vectors (optimized by different sub-optimal
solutions), we tackle the gain loss due to dimensionality
reduction of the null space of the IUs channel matrix and
a close to optimal performance is achieved.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the system model and Section III presents the
original formulation of the sum secrecy rate maximization
problem for the non-cooperative EHs case. In Section IV, we
provide the optimal solution for the non-cooperative EHs case.
Sub-optimal solutions for the non-cooperative EHs case are
provided in Section V. In Section VI, a special case of non-
cooperative EHs is presented and in Section VII we provide
the complexity analysis of the proposed solutions. Numerical
results and evaluations are presented in Section VIII. Finally,
conclusions are given in Section IX.
Notation: Vectors are denoted by boldface lower case letters
and matrices by boldface upper case letters. IN , 0m×n and
1M denote an N ×N identity matrix, an m× n zero matrix
and an M×1 column vector with all entries one, respectively.
diag(x) denotes a diagonal matrix with the elements of x in
the main diagonal. Re (Q) and Im (Q) denote the real and
imaginary parts of matrix Q, respectively. S  0 indicates
that S is a positive semi-definite matrix. R denotes the set of
real numbers. The operators (·)T , (·)H , Tr (·), log (·), log2 (·),
|·| and ‖·‖F denote the transpose, conjugate transpose, trace
of a matrix, natural logarithm, logarithm to base 2, absolute
value of scalars and Frobenius norm of matrices, respectively.
‖[x1, ..., xM ]‖1 =
∑M
i=1 |xi| .Cm×n denotes the set of all
complex m×n matrices. x ∼ CN (0,Σ) denotes a circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian random vector x ∈ CN×1 with
zero mean and covariance matrix Σ. {an} denotes a set of
all vectors indexed by n. [a]i, dim(a) denote the ith entry
and the length of the vector a, respectively. x  0 means
that [x]i ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., dim (x). B = null (A), which means,
AB = 0 and BBH = I .
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a flat fading single-cell MU-MISO downlink sys-
tem as shown in Fig. 1. The system comprises a base station
3Fig. 1. An MU-MISO SWIPT system comprising multiple
IUs and multiple EHs.
(BS) with N antennas, M < N single-antenna IUs, {IUi},
i = 1, ...,M , interested in information decoding and K single-
antenna EHs, {EHk}, k = 1, ...,K, wishing to perform energy
harvesting. The EHs are assumed to be located closer to the
BS compared to the IUs in order to harvest energy from the BS
transmitted RF signal. Let H = [h1, ...,hM ]H ∈ CM×N and
G = [g1, ..., gK ]
H ∈ CK×N be the channel matrices between
the BS and IUs, EHs, respectively, with hi ∼ CN
(
0, γ2IIN
)
,
gk ∼ CN
(
0, γ2EIN
)
. The BS is assumed to have full
knowledge of H and G. To facilitate secure information
transmission, the BS employs transmit beamforming to steer
M information signal beams toward the IUs along with
L ≤ N AN beams directed toward the EHs to degrade their
received information signal quality. Let x = [x1, ..., xM ]T ,
W = [w1, ...,wM ] ∈ CN×M and Q = [q1, ..., qL] ∈ CN×L
denote the information symbol vector intended for the IUs with
E
{
xxH
}
= IM , the information beamforming matrix and
the AN beamforming matrix, respectively. The signal received
at IUi, i = 1, ...,M , is
yIi = h
H
i wixi +
M∑
m=1
m 6=i
hHi wmxm +
L∑
l=1
hHi qlzl + nIi , (1)
where nIi ∼ CN
(
0, σ2I
)
is the noise at IUi and zl is the AN
symbol. The signal received at EHk is
yEk = g
H
k wixi +
M∑
m=1
m 6=i
gHk wmxm +
L∑
l=1
gHk qlzl + nEk , (2)
where nEk ∼ CN
(
0, σ2E
)
is the noise at EHk.
In this paper, unless otherwise stated, we assume that each
EH relies on itself to decode the information signal intended
for the IUi, i.e., there is no cooperation between the EHs to
decode the information signal. According to (1) and (2), with
the assumption that the EHs are decoding the information
signal without an attempt to harvest energy, the signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at IUi, SINRIi , and the
SINR at EH
k
intending to wire-tap the IUi’s signal, SINRiEk ,
are obtained as
SINRIi =
∣∣∣hHi wi∣∣∣2∑M
m=1
m 6=i
∣∣∣hHi wm∣∣∣2 +∑Ll=1 ∣∣∣hHi ql∣∣∣2 + σ2I , (3)
SINRiEk =
∣∣gHk wi∣∣2∑L
l=1
∣∣gHk ql∣∣2 +∑Mm=1
m 6=i
∣∣gHk wm∣∣2 + σ2E . (4)
The achievable secrecy rate for IUi when wire-tapped by EHk
(Ri,k) is given by
Ri,k = max
(
log2 (1 + SINRIi)− log2
(
1 + SINRiEk
)
, 0
)
.
(5)
In our system, all EHs can harvest energy from the informa-
tion and AN signals (we assume that the harvested energy from
the noise is negligible). Assuming unit time slot duration and
all EHs have the same energy harvesting efficiency 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1,
the total energy harvested by all EHs is
E = ζTr
(
Gˆ
(
Qˆ+
M∑
i=1
Wˆ i
))
, (6)
where Wˆ i = wiwHi , Qˆ =
∑L
l=1 qlq
H
l , and Gˆ = G
HG.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Our focus is on optimizing the downlink beamforming
matrices for both information and AN signals to maximize
the sum secrecy rate of the IUs under given constraints on
the minimum total harvested energy received by the EHs and
total BS’s transmit power Pt. The design aims to maximize
the worst-case sum secrecy rate, given by
R =
M∑
i=1
min
k
Ri,k =log2
(
M∏
i=1
(1 + SINRIi)
)
− log2
(
M∏
i=1
max
k
(
1 + SINRiEk
))
. (7)
Therefore, by expressing the quadratic terms (vector and
matrix norms) in terms of linear functions of positive semid-
ifinite matrix variables Wˆ i, Qˆ, and deterministic matrices
Hi = hih
H
i , Gk = gkg
H
k and Gˆ, the SDP optimization
problem can be formulated as
maximize
{Wˆ i},Qˆ
log2
 M∏
i=1
∑M
m=1 Tr
(
HiWˆm
)
+ Tr
(
HiQˆ
)
+ σ2I∑M
m=1
m 6=i
Tr
(
HiWˆm
)
+ Tr
(
HiQˆ
)
+ σ2I
−
log2
 M∏
i=1
max
k
∑M
m=1 Tr
(
GkWˆm
)
+ Tr
(
GkQˆ
)
+ σ2E∑M
m=1
m 6=i
Tr
(
GkWˆm
)
+ Tr
(
GkQˆ
)
+ σ2E

subject to Tr
(
Qˆ
)
+ Tr
(
M∑
i=1
Wˆ i
)
≤ Pt, (8a)
4ζ Tr
(
Gˆ
(
Qˆ+
M∑
i=1
Wˆ i
))
≥ E¯, (8b)
Wˆ i, Qˆ  0, ∀i, (8c)
where E¯ is the constraint on the total harvested energy by all
EHs. It can be seen that the problem has a complicated non-
convex objective function which includes logarithms of the
product of fractional quadratic functions. The beamforming
matrices
{
Wˆ i
}
should aim to solve a contradicting bal-
ance between the following: increasing the information signal
power at the IUs, cancelling inter-user interference, reducing
the information signal power at the EHs and assisting the EHs
to harvest energy. On the other hand, the AN beamforming
matrix, Qˆ, should be optimized to jam the EHs and provide
them with a source to harvest energy along with reducing
the AN power at the IUs. Since the power budget at the
BS is limited, the power allocation between Tr
(∑M
i=1 Wˆ i
)
and Tr
(
Qˆ
)
should be held in the optimal balance. In the
following, we provide optimal and suboptimal solutions for
the design problems.
IV. OPTIMAL SOLUTION
A. Problem Feasibility and Reformulation
In this section, we solve optimization problem (8) optimally
through reformulating the objective function and the non-
convex constraints by using a change of variables, linearisation
and semidefinite relaxation of quadratic terms. First, let us
examine the feasibility of problem (8) through solving the
constraints (8a) and (8b). The upper bound of total harvested
energy (the largest total energy that could be harvested) is
obtained sharply when the BS transmits with its full power, Pt,
along with aligning the direction of
(
Qˆ+
∑M
i=1 Wˆ i
)
such
that (
Qˆ+
M∑
i=1
Wˆ i
)
= Pt̺̺
H , (9)
where ̺ is the eigenvector which corresponds to the largest
eigenvalue of the matrix Gˆ, λg [27]. This is the case in which
problem (8) is reduced to an energy harvesting maximization
problem with information beamforming vectors set to zero,
i.e.,
∑M
i=1 Wˆ i = 0, and the BS transmits AN precoded with
a single beamforming vector q1 =
√
Pt̺. According to this,
we can write constraint (8b) as
ζPtλg ≥ ζTr
(
Gˆ
(
Qˆ+
M∑
i=1
Wˆ i
))
≥ E¯. (10)
With the existence of Pt in the left-hand side of (10), the
satisfaction of (11) will definitely result in satisfying the
constraint (8a), therefore, the feasibility of problem (8) is
guaranteed under the following condition
ζPtλg ≥ E¯. (11)
Now, let us reformulate the objective function which com-
prises a product of fractional terms. For this goal, we build
upon the change of variable idea proposed in [28]. Let us
substitute the numerators and denominators of the fractions
in the objective function in (8) by exponential variables as
follows
eui =
M∑
m=1
Tr
(
HiWˆm
)
+ Tr
(
HiQˆ
)
+ σ2I , ∀i, (12a)
esi =
M∑
m=1
m 6=i
Tr
(
HiWˆm
)
+ Tr
(
HiQˆ
)
+ σ2I , ∀i, (12b)
evk =
M∑
m=1
Tr
(
GkWˆm
)
+ Tr
(
GkQˆ
)
+ σ2E , ∀k, (12c)
eti,k =
M∑
m=1
m 6=i
Tr
(
GkWˆm
)
+ Tr
(
GkQˆ
)
+ σ2E , ∀i, ∀k.
(12d)
By using properties of the exponential and the logarithmic
functions, we can write the objective function in (8) as∑M
i=1 (ui − si −maxk (vk − ti,k)) whilst constraining ui, si,
vk and ti,k by the expressions at the right hand sides of
(12a), (12b), (12c) and (12d), respectively. Therefore, by
defining real-valued slack variables u = [u1, ..., uM ]T , s =
[s1, ..., sM ]
T
, v = [v1, ..., vK ]
T
, T =
[
t1,1 ... t1,K
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
tM,1 ... tM,K
]
and the
set of optimization variables
{{
Wˆm
}
, Qˆ, s,T ,u,v
}
= S,
m = 1, ...,M , the SDP reformulation of problem (8) is
maximize
S
M∑
i=1
(
ui − si − max
k=1,...,K
(vk − ti,k)
)
subject to
M∑
m=1
Tr
(
HiWˆm
)
+ Tr
(
HiQˆ
)
+ σ2I ≥ eui , ∀i, (13a)
M∑
m=1
m 6=i
Tr
(
HiWˆm
)
+ Tr
(
HiQˆ
)
+ σ2I ≤ esi , ∀i, (13b)
M∑
m=1
Tr
(
GkWˆm
)
+ Tr
(
GkQˆ
)
+ σ2E ≤ evk , ∀k, (13c)
M∑
m=1
m 6=i
Tr
(
GkWˆm
)
+ Tr
(
GkQˆ
)
+ σ2E ≥ eti,k , ∀ti,k, (13d)
(8a), (8b), (8c). (13e)
The objective function in (13) consists of a sum of affine
functions
(∑M
i=1 ui − si
)
minus a sum of maxima of affine
functions
(∑M
i=1 max
k
(vk − ti,k)
)
which is convex. There-
fore, the affine part minus the convex part will result in
a concave objective function. To deal with the non-convex
constraints (13b) and (13c), we linearize the exponential terms
esi and evk using the first order Taylor approximation, such
that esi = es¯i (si − s¯i + 1) and evk = ev¯k (vk − v¯k + 1),
∀i, where s¯ = [s¯1, ..., s¯M ]T and v¯(1) = [v¯(1)1 , ..., v¯(1)K ]T
5are the points around which the linearizations are made.
Also, we drop the rank-one constraint on
{
Wˆm
}
such that
rank
(
Wˆm
)
≤ N , m = 1, ...,M . Therefore, problem (13)
can be recast as
maximize
S
M∑
i=1
(
ui − si − max
k=1,...,K
(vk − ti,k)
)
subject to
M∑
m=1
m 6=i
Tr
(
HiWˆm
)
+ Tr
(
HiQˆ
)
+ σ2I
≤ es¯i (si − s¯i + 1) , ∀i, (14a)
M∑
i=1
Tr
(
GkWˆ i
)
+ Tr
(
GkQˆ
)
+ σ2E
≤ ev¯k (vk − v¯k + 1) , ∀k, (14b)
(13a), (13d), (8a), (8b), (8c). (14c)
Problem (14) can be solved iteratively by Algorithm 1 using
the CVX optimization software [29].
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for solving problem (14)
1: Initialize s¯[j] and v¯[j], j = 1.
2: Repeat
3: Solve problem (14) and calculate
{
Wˆ i
}[j]
, Qˆ
[j]
, s[j], v[j].
4: Increment j = j + 1.
5: Update the initial values s¯[j] = s[j−1] and v¯[j] = v[j−1].
6: Until Convergence.
7: Calculate W and Q from
{
Wˆ i
}
and Qˆ.
Remark 1: To guarantee sufficient harvested energy for all
EHs, problem (14) can be recast by replacing the total har-
vested energy constraint (8b) with individual energy harvesting
constraints as
maximize
S
M∑
i=1
(
ui − si − max
k=1,...,K
(vk − ti,k)
)
subject to
ζ Tr
(
Gk
(
Qˆ+
M∑
i=1
Wˆ i
))
≥ Eˆ, ∀k, (15a)
(14a), (14b), (13a), (13d), (8a), (8c). (15b)
where Eˆ is the minimum harvested energy per individual EH.
B. Optimal Rank-one Solution to the SDR Reformulation
In the solutions
{
Wˆ
⋆1
m
}
and
{
Wˆ
⋆2
m
}
, m = 1, ...,M ,
obtained by solving problems (14) and (15), respectively, there
is no guarantee that rank
(
Wˆ
⋆j
m
)
= 1, j = 1, 2, ∀m,
such that it can take the form Wˆ
⋆j
m = w
⋆j
mw
⋆jH
m . Therefore,
if rank
(
Wˆ
⋆j
m
)
= 1, then the optimal beamforming vectors
are calculated using eigenvalue decomposition. Otherwise, if
rank
(
Wˆ
⋆j
m
)
> 1, building upon the framework in [6], [7],
an optimal rank-one solution can be calculated by using the
following theorem.
Theorem 1: Having the optimal solutions{{
Wˆ
⋆j
m
}
, Qˆ
⋆j
, s⋆j ,T ⋆j ,u⋆j ,v⋆j
}
= S⋆j , j = 1, 2, for SDR
problems (14) and (15), respectively, with rank
(
Wˆ
⋆j
m¯
)
> 1,
{m¯} ⊂ {1, ...,M} and {m¯} 6= φ. Then, there exist
optimal solutions
{{
W˜
⋆j
m
}
, Q˜
⋆j
, s˜⋆j , T˜
⋆j
,u⋆j ,v⋆j
}
= S˜⋆j ,
j = 1, 2, for the SDR problems (14) and (15), respectively,
that satisfy a rank-one constraint, rank
(
W˜
⋆j
m¯
)
= 1 and can
achieve the same objective value achieved by S⋆j , j = 1, 2,
respectively.
Proof: See the Appendix.
V. SUBOPTIMAL SOLUTIONS
In this subsection, we derive suboptimal solutions to prob-
lem (8) with lower complexity. The solution is based on
designing the directions of wis to nullify the information sig-
nal interference whilst maximizing the information signal for
each information user. In addition, two different beamforming
vectors for the AN are considered, q1 and q2. The vector q1
is designed to nullify the AN at the IUs while q2 ignores AN
alignment at the IUs. The direction design is followed by per
beamformer power control.
Let H˜i = [h1, ...,hi−1,hi+1,hM ]H with a singular value
decomposition (SVD) H˜i = U iΣi
[
V iV¯ i
]H
, where V¯ i ∈
CN×(N−M+1) contains the last N − M + 1 right-singular
vectors with V¯ Hi V¯ i = IN−M+1. The vectors constituting
V¯ i are the basis for the right null space of H˜i, i.e., H˜iV¯ i =
0(M−1)×(N−M+1). Therefore, to nullify the information signal
interference at the IUi, we should design the IUi’s beamformer
as
wi =
√
piw¯i =
√
piV¯ iwˆi, (16)
where pi is the power assigned to wi and wˆi ∈ C(N−M+1)×1
is an arbitrary unit norm complex vector. To maximize the
signal at the IUi, wˆi is aligned to the direction of the
equivalent channel hHi V¯ i, i.e., wˆi =
V¯
H
i hi
|V¯ Hi hi| .
Using a similar concept, we design the direction of the
AN beamforming vector, q1. Let H = UΣ
[
V V¯
]H be the
singular value decomposition of H , with V¯ ∈ CN×(N−M)
containing the last N −M right-singular vectors. Therefore,
it can be guaranteed that there is no AN leakage to the IUs,
i.e., Hq1 = 0M×1, by designing q1 as
q1 =
√
pn1 q¯1 =
√
pn1 V¯ qˆ1, (17)
where pn1 is the AN power of q1 and qˆ1 ∈ C(N−M)×1
is an arbitrary complex unit norm vector. The total power
harvested by the EHs from the AN is pn1
∥∥GV¯ qˆ1∥∥2F . Let
ν be the unit norm eigenvector corresponding to the largest
eigenvalue value of the matrix V¯ HGHGV¯ , then, to maximize
the total harvested energy, the optimal value of qˆ1 is qˆ1 = ν.
The other AN beamforming vector, q2, aims to maximize the
total harvested energy without paying attention to the noise it
imposes on the IUs. Therefore
q2 =
√
pn2 q¯2, (18)
6where pn2 is the AN power of q2, q¯2 is the unit norm
eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue value of
the matrix GHG.
Now, we establish three sub-optimal solutions based on
three different sets of AN beamforming vectors; the first sub-
optimal solution, sub(1), uses the AN beamforming vector
Q1 = {q¯1}, the second sub-optimal solution, sub(2), uses
the AN beamforming vector Q2 = {q¯2}, while the third sub-
optimal solution, sub(3), uses two AN beamforming vectors
Q3 = {q¯1, q¯2}. Based on the designed directions of {wi}, we
write the secrecy rate for IUi, when wire-tapped by EHk and
using the Qj , j = 1, 2, 3, set of AN beamforming vectors, as
R
sub(j)
i,k = log2
pi
∣∣∣hHi w¯i∣∣∣2 + pn2 ∣∣∣hHi q¯2∣∣∣2 + σ2I
pn2
∣∣∣hHi q¯2∣∣∣2 + σ2I
−
max
k
log2

∑M
i=1 pi
∣∣gHk w¯i∣∣2 + ∑
l∈Ij
pnl
∣∣gHk q¯l∣∣2 + σ2E∑M
m=1
m 6=i
pm
∣∣gHk w¯m∣∣2 + ∑
l∈Ij
pnl
∣∣gHk q¯l∣∣2 + σ2E
 ,
(19)
where I1, I2 and I3 are index sets containing the indices of
the vectors in Q1, Q2 and Q3, respectively. Now, we define
three different problems P (j), j = 1, 2, 3, corresponding to
the use of the three different sets of AN beamforming vectors
Q1, Q2 and Q3. The power vector P = [p1, ..., pM ] and pn1 ,
pn2 , are optimized to maximize the worst-case sum secrecy
rate
(
Rsub(j) =
∑M
i=1 min
k
R
sub(j)
i,k
)
by solving the following
problem P (j) (change of variables and Taylor approximation
are exploited to formulate the problem)
P (j) : maximize
uˆ,sˆ,vˆ,Tˆ ,
P ,pn1 ,pn2
M∑
i=1
(
uˆi − sˆi −max
k
(
vˆk − tˆi,k
))
subject to
pi
∣∣∣hHi w¯i∣∣∣2 + pn2 ∣∣∣hHi q¯2∣∣∣2 + σ2I ≥ euˆi , ∀i, (20a)
pn2
∣∣∣hHi q¯2∣∣∣2 + σ2I ≤ e¯ˆsi (sˆi − ¯ˆsi + 1) , ∀i, (20b)
M∑
i=1
pi
∣∣gHk w¯i∣∣2 +∑
l∈Ij
pnl
∣∣gHk q¯l∣∣2 + σ2E ≤
e
¯ˆvk
(
vˆk − ¯ˆvk + 1
)
, ∀k, (20c)
M∑
m=1
m 6=i
pm
∣∣gHk w¯m∣∣2 +∑
l∈Ij
pnl
∣∣gHk q¯l∣∣2 + σ2E ≥ etˆi,k , ∀tˆi,k,
(20d)∑
l∈Ij
pnl +
M∑
i=1
pi ≤ Pt, (20e)
M∑
i=1
pi ‖Gw¯i‖2F +
∑
l∈Ij
pnl ‖Gq¯l‖2F ≥ E¯, (20f)
where uˆ = [uˆ1, ..., uˆM ]T , sˆ = [sˆ1, ..., sˆM ]T , vˆ =
[vˆ1, ..., vˆK ]
T and Tˆ =
 tˆ1,1 ... tˆ1,K.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
tˆM,1 ... tˆM,K
 are slack variables.
Problem (20) is solved iteratively, after each iteration, ¯ˆs =
[¯ˆs1, ..., ¯ˆsM ]
T and ¯ˆv = [¯ˆv1, ..., ¯ˆvK ]T , the Taylor initial value
in (20b) and (20c), are updated by the optimized value of sˆ
and vˆ. The iterations continue until convergence in a similar
manner to that in Algorithm 1.
Remark 2: To guarantee sufficient harvested energy for
all EHs, problem (20) can be recast by replacing the total
harvested energy constraint (20f) with individual energy har-
vesting constraints as
P¯ (j) : maximize
uˆ,sˆ,vˆ,Tˆ ,
P ,pn1 ,pn2
M∑
i=1
(
uˆi − sˆi −max
k
(
vˆk − tˆi,k
))
subject to
M∑
i=1
pi
∣∣gHk w¯i∣∣2F +∑
l∈Ij
pnl
∣∣gHk q¯l∣∣2F ≥ Eˆ, ∀k (21a)
(20a), (20b), (20c), (20d), (20e). (21b)
Problem (21) can be solved iteratively in a similar manner as
in (20).
VI. SPECIAL CASE OF COOPERATIVE EHS
In this section, we consider a special case when all EHs
cooperate to decode the IUi’s signal, therefore, they have the
ability to cancel the information signal interference. The sum
secrecy rate in this case is given by
log2
 M∏
i=1
∑M
m=1 Tr
(
HiWˆm
)
+ Tr
(
HiQˆ
)
+ σ2I∑M
m=1
m 6=i
Tr
(
HiWˆm
)
+ Tr
(
HiQˆ
)
+ σ2I
×
Tr
(
GˆQˆ
)
+Kσ2E
Tr
(
GˆWˆ i
)
+ Tr
(
GˆQˆ
)
+Kσ2E
 . (22)
Defining real-valued slack variables v¨ and
t¨ =
[
t¨1, ..., t¨M
]T
and the set of optimization variables{
u, s, v¨, t¨,
{
Wˆm
}
, Qˆ
}
= S¨, m = 1, ...,M , the SDP
reformulation of the sum secrecy rate maximization problem
is
maximize
S¨
M∑
i=1
(
ui − si + v¨ − t¨i
)
subject to
Tr
(
GˆQˆ
)
+Kσ2E ≥ ev¨, (23a)
Tr
(
GˆWˆ i
)
+ Tr
(
GˆQˆ
)
+Kσ2E ≤ e
¯¨ti
(
t¨i − ¯¨ti + 1
)
, ∀i,
(23b)
(13a), (14a), (13e). (23c)
Problem (23) is solved iteratively, after each iteration,
¯¨t = [¯¨t1, ...,
¯¨tM ]
T and s¯ (see constraint (14a)) are updated by
7the optimized value of t¨ and s. The iterations continue until
convergence in a similar manner to that in Algorithm 1.
By following comparable steps as in the proof of Theorem
I, given the optimal rank-unconstrained solution of problem
(23), S¨⋆ =
{{
Wˆ
⋆
m
}
, Qˆ
⋆
, s⋆, t¨
⋆
,u⋆, v¨⋆
}
, we can calcu-
late an optimal solution S˜ =
{{
W˜m
}
, Q˜, s˜, t¨
⋆
, u⋆, v˜
}
that satisfies the rank-one constraints, rank
(
W˜ m¯
)
= 1,
m¯ ∈
{
m : rank
(
Wˆ
⋆
m
)
> 1
}
and achieves the same objective
value as S¨⋆ does, as follows
W˜m = b¯m,n¯1m ω¯m,n¯mω¯
H
m,n¯m
=
{
Wˆ
⋆
m − τ¯m ∀m ∈ {m¯}
Wˆ
⋆
m, ∀m /∈ {m¯}
,
(24)
s˜m =
s⋆m + δ¯
(1)
m , ∀m ∈ {m¯} , ∑¯
m
Tr (Hm¯τ¯ m¯) ≤ Tr
(
Gˆ
∑¯
m
τ¯m
)
s⋆m + δ¯
(2)
m , ∀m ∈ {m¯} , ∑¯
m
Tr (Hm¯τ¯ m¯) ≥ Tr
(
Gˆ
∑¯
m
τ¯m
)
s⋆m, ∀m /∈ {m¯}
(25)
v˜ =
v¨⋆ +
∑¯
m
δ¯
(1)
m , ∀m ∈ {m¯} , ∑¯
m
Tr (Hm¯τ¯ m¯) ≤ Tr
(
Gˆ
∑¯
m
τ¯m
)
v¨⋆ +
∑¯
m
δ¯
(2)
m , ∀m ∈ {m¯} , ∑¯
m
Tr (Hm¯τ¯ m¯) ≥ Tr
(
Gˆ
∑¯
m
τ¯m
)
v¨⋆, ∀m /∈ {m¯}
(26)
Q˜ = Qˆ
⋆
+
∑
m∈{m¯}
τ¯m, (27)
where
n¯m ∈ {1, ..., r¯2m − r¯1m} , (28)
τ¯m =
N−r¯2m∑
n=1
a¯m,nψ¯m,nψ¯
H
m,n +
N−r¯m∑
n1=1
n1 6=n¯1m
b¯m,n1ω¯m,n1ω¯
H
m,n1
,
(29)
δ¯(1)m = −s⋆m + log
(
Tr (Hmτ¯m) + es
⋆
m
)
, (30)
δ¯(2)m = −v¨⋆ + log
 Tr (Hmτ¯m)∑¯
m
Tr (Hmτ¯m)
∑
m¯
Tr
(
Gˆτm
)
+ ev¨
⋆
 ,
(31)
r¯1m = rank
(
Y¨
⋆
m
)
, r¯2m = rank
(
D¨
⋆
m
)
, (32)[
ψ¯m,1, ..., ψ¯m,N−r¯2m
]
= Ψ¯m = null
(
D¨
⋆
m
)
, (33)[
Ψ¯m
[
ω¯m,1, ..., ω¯m,r¯2m−r¯1m
]]
= null
(
Y¨
⋆
m
)
, (34)
Y¨
⋆
m = D¨
⋆
m −
M∑
i=1
β⋆3iHi, D¨
⋆
m = β
⋆
1 − ζβ⋆2Gˆ, (35)
and β⋆1 , β⋆2 ,
{
β⋆3i
}
,
{
Y¨
⋆
m
}
, are the optimal multipliers
associated with the constraints (8a), (8b), (13a) and the positive
semidefinitness constraints of
{
Wˆm
}
in (8c), respectively;
a¯m,ns > 0 and b¯m,n1s > 0 are positive scaling constants.
By using the beamforming vectors wis, q1 and q2 in (16)-
(18), and defining new slack variables vˇ and tˇ = [tˇ1, ..., tˇM ]T ,
three different suboptimal solutions for sum secrecy rate
maximization can be obtained by formulating problems having
a similar structure to problem (20) as follows
Pˆ (j) : maximize
uˆ,sˆ,vˇ,tˇ,P ,pn1 ,pn2
M∑
i=1
(
uˆi − sˆi + vˇ − tˇi
)
subject to
pi ‖Gw¯i‖2F +
∑
l∈Ij
pnl ‖Gq¯l‖2F +Kσ2E ≤
etˇi
(
tˇi − ¯ˇti + 1
)
, ∀i, (36a)∑
l∈Ij
pnl ‖Gq¯l‖2F +Kσ2E ≥ evˇ, (36b)
(20a), (20b), (20e), (20f). (36c)
Problem (36) is solved iteratively, after each iteration,
¯ˇt =
[
¯ˇt1, ...,
¯ˇtM
]T
and ¯ˆs (see constraint (20b)) are updated by
the optimized value of tˇ and sˆ, respectively. The iterations
continue until convergence in a similar manner to that in
Algorithm 1.
VII. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
The complexity of our solutions (the optimal and the sub
optimal) relate to the type of the optimization problems, the
size of input data, number of the required iterations and the
methods used to solve them. The most generic problems, (14)
for the optimal solution and P (3) in (20) for the suboptimal
solution are convex and solved by CVX software. The solvers
used by CVX software (such as SDPT3 and SeDuMi) employ
a symmetric primal-dual interior-point algorithm which can-
not handle the exponential function in the constraints (13a),
(13d), (20a) and (20d). Therefore, CVX uses the successive
approximation method in which the exponential functions are
approximated in a polynomial form, and then the resulting
problem is solved iteratively until convergence [29]–[31]. The
per-iteration problem for the formulation in (14) is equivalent
to an SDP problem, while, the per-iteration problem for P (3)
in (20) is equivalent to a linear program (LP). For similar
convergence tolerance, we compare the complexity of both
problems, (14) and P (3) in (20) by comparing the complexity
of the per-iteration problems. For that purpose, we use the
basic complexity analysis steps in chapter 6 in [32].
A. Complexity of Suboptimal Solution
To follow the steps of the complexity analysis given in chap-
ter 6 in [32], we need to transform the per-iteration problem for
P (3) in (20) (in which all exponential functions are approxi-
mated by first order polynomials) into an equivalent standard
LP form. First, we transform the max operator expression
8in the objective function
(∑M
i=1maxk=1,...,K
(
vˆk − tˆi,k
))
by
introducing a new vector slack variable π ∈ RM×1 such that
the max operator expression will be 1TMπ, where 1M is a
M × 1 vector with all entries one, with KM constraints (per
scalar value) [π]i ≥ vˆk − [tk]i , ∀i, ∀k, where tk ∈ RM×1 is
the kth column of Tˆ . Now we can transform the per-iteration
problem in its standard LP form as follows
(Psub) : maximize
x
cTx
subject to
A(1) x  d1, (37a)
A(2) x  d2, (37b)
A(3) x  d3, (37c)
A(4k) x  d4k , ∀k, (37d)
aT(5) x ≤ Pt, (37e)
aT(6) x ≥ E¯, (37f)
A(7k) x  0, ∀k, (37g)
A(8) x  0. (37h)
where
x =
[
p1, ..., pM , pn1 , pn2 , uˆ
T , sˆT , vˆT , tT1 , ..., t
T
K ,π
T
]T
, c =[
01×M+2,1
T
M ,−1TM ,01×(M+1)K ,1TM
]T
, A(1) =[
aT(11), ...,a
T
(1M )
]
, A(2) =
[
aT(21), ...,a
T
(2M )
]
, A(3) =[
aT(31), ...,a
T
(3K)
]
, A(4k) =
[
aT(4k1), ...,a
T
(4kM )
]
, a(5) =[
1
T
M+2,01×(3+K)M+K
]T
, A(7k) =
[
aT(7k1), ...,a
T
(7kM )
]T
,
a(7ki) =
[
01×3M+2+k−1,−1,01×K−k+(k−1)M+i−1, 1,
01×(K−k+1)M−1, 1,01×M−i
]T
, A(8) = [IM+2,
0M+2×(3+K)M+K
]T
, [d1]i = −σ2I + e¯ˆui
(
1− ¯ˆui
)
,
[d2]i = −σ2I + e¯ˆsi
(
1− ¯ˆsi
)
, [d3]k = −σ2E + e¯ˆvk
(
1− ¯ˆvk
)
,
[d4k ]i = −σ2E + e
¯ˆti,k
(
1− ¯ˆti,k
)
, and — ¯ˆui, ¯ˆsi, ∀i,
¯ˆvk, ∀k and ¯ˆti,k, ∀i ∀k are the initial values of first order
approximation,
[
a(1i)
]
j
=

∣∣∣hHi w¯i∣∣∣2 , j = i∣∣∣hHi q¯2∣∣∣2 , j = M + 2
−e¯ˆui , j = M + 2 + i
0, otherwise
, (38)
[
a(2i)
]
j
=

∣∣∣hHi q¯2∣∣∣2 , j = M + 2
−e¯ˆsi , j = 2M + 2 + i
0, otherwise
, (39)
[
a(3k)
]
j
=

∣∣gHk w¯j∣∣2 , j = 1, ...,M∣∣gHk q¯j∣∣2 , j = M + 1,M + 2
−e¯ˆvk , j = 3M + 2 + k
0, otherwise
, (40)
[
a(6)
]
j
=

‖Gw¯j‖2F , j = 1, ...,M∥∥Gq¯j∥∥2F , j = M + 1,M + 2
0, otherwise
, (41)
[
a(4ki)
]
j
=

∣∣gHk w¯j∣∣2 , j = 1, ..., i− 1, i+ 1, ...,M∣∣gHk q¯j∣∣2 , j = M + 1,M + 2
−e¯ˆti,k , j = 3M +K + 2 +M(i− 1) + k
0, otherwise
.
(42)
With the standard LP formulation in (37), the complexity
of attaining an optimized objective value within an accuracy
ǫ, Comp (Psub, ǫ), is calculated in terms of the following
parameters:
ns = dim x = (4 + K)M + K + 2, the dimension
of real design variables; ms = (3 + 2K)M + K + 4,
the total number of per-scalar value constraints;
and Data (Psub) =
[
ns, ms, c
T , vec
(
A(1)
)T
,
vec
(
A(2)
)T
, vec
(
A(3)
)T
, vec
(
A(41)
)T
, ..., vec
(
A(4K)
)T
,
aT(5), a
T
(6), vec
(
A(71)
)T
, ..., vec
(
A(7K)
)T
, vec
(
A(8)
)T
,
dT1 , d
T
2 , d
T
3 , d
T
41 , ..., d
T
4K , Pt, E¯
]T
, input data vector for
Psub where dim Data (Psub) = (3ns + 2nsK + K + 2)M +
(ns + 1)K + 4ns + 4.
The per-iteration complexity in terms of the number of real
operations, Comp (Psub, ǫ), is calculated as [32]
Comp (Psub, ǫ) = (ns +ms)
3
2 n2s
× ln
(
dim Data (Psub) + ‖Data (Psub)‖1 + ǫ2
ǫ
)
. (43)
The result in (43) assumes that the input data matrices and
vectors are unstructured. However, the solver can utilize this
matrix structure to reduce the number of operations required
for getting the solution.
B. Complexity of Optimal Solution
As in the previous subsection, the first step in analyzing the
complexity of the per-iteration problem of (14) is to transform
it into a standard SDP form with all constraints expressed in
terms of linear matrix inequalities (LMIs). For this purpose,
we use the idea of the Schur complement to describe the
quadratic constraint in terms of semidefinitness of the bock
matrix. For example, the constraint (14a) is transformed into
an LMI constraint as described below
hHi
−Qˆ−
 M∑
m=1
m 6=i
Wˆm
+ −σ2I + es¯i (si − s¯i + 1)‖hi‖2 IN
hi
≤ 0, ∀i, (44a)~w
C1i =
[
D−1i hi
hHi 0
]
=(Qˆ+ (∑Mm=1
m 6=i
Wˆm
)
+
σ2I−e
s¯i (si−s¯i+1)
‖hi‖
2 IN
)−1
hi
hHi 0

 0 ∀i. (44b)
We get (44a) from (14a) based on properties of the trace oper-
ator and matrix multiplication, and the independence between{
Wˆm
}
and Qˆ. The non-singularity of Di is guaranteed by
9the non-zero identity. The block matrix in (44b) is positive
semidefinite if and only if both the lower-right sub-matrix
(scalar), 0, and the Schur complement of the upper-left sub-
matrix D−1i in C1i , 0−hHi D−1i hi, are positive semidefinite.
Since the positive semidefinitness of the scalar 0 is always
true, therefore the constraints (44b) and (14a) are equivalent.
The remaining constraints, (14b), (13a), (13d), (8a) and (8b)
are transformed in the same way (after first order linearization
of the exponential variables). As in the previous subsec-
tion, the max operator expression in the objective function(∑M
i=1maxk=1,...,K (vk − ti,k)
)
is recast as 1TM πˆ , where
πˆ ∈ RM×1 is a vector slack variable, with KM constraints
(per scalar value) [πˆ]i ≥ vk−[tk]i , ∀i, ∀k, where tk ∈ RM×1
is the kth column of T .
Using the fact that the diagonal matrix is positive semidef-
inite if and only if each of its entries are ≥ 0, the KM
constraints [πˆ]i ≥ vk − [tk]i , ∀i, ∀k, can be transformed
to LMI constraints as1
(πˆ + tk − vk)T IM  0 ∀k. (45)
The per-iteration problem for (14) is thereby written in its
standard SDP form as follows
(Popt) : maximize
x
cˆ
T
xˆ
subject to
C1i , C2k , C3i , C4i,k  0, ∀i, ∀k, (46a)
C5, C6  0, (46b)
c7k  0, ∀k, (46c)
Wˆ i, Qˆ  0. ∀i, (46d)
where
xˆ =
[
uT , sT ,vT , tˆ
T
1 , ..., tˆ
T
K , πˆ
T
]T
,
cˆ =
[
1
T
M ,−1TM ,01×(M+1)K ,1TM
]T
,
C2k =(Qˆ+ ( M∑
m=1
Wˆ i
)
+
σ2E−e
v¯k (vk−v¯k+1)
‖gk‖
2 IN
)−1
gk
gHk 0
 ,
C3i =[(
−Qˆ−
(∑M
m=1 Wˆm
)
+
−σ2I+e
u¯i (ui−u¯i+1)
‖hi‖
2 IN
)−1
hi
hHi 0
]
,
C4i,k =
−Qˆ−
 M∑
m=1
m 6=i
Wˆm
− σ2E−et¯i,k (ti,k−t¯i,k+1)
‖gk‖
2 IN
−1 gk
gHk 0

C5 =
[(
Qˆ+
(∑M
i=1 Wˆ i
)
− Pt
N
IN
)−1
1N
1
H
N 0
]
,
C6 =
1The vector inequality x  0 is equivalent to the LMI diag(x)  0.

[(
−ζ
(
Qˆ+
(∑M
i=1 Wˆ i
))
+ E¯
N
IN
)−1
1N
1
H
N 0
]
, E¯ 6= 0
0 , E¯ = 0
,
c7k = (πˆ + tk − vk)T IM .
The standard SDP problem in (46) is represented in a
complex-valued domain. Translating the complex-valued do-
main SDP (CSDP) programme to a real-valued domain SDP
programme was introduced in [33] using linear complex-to-
real mapping. In our case, we translate the CSDP programme,
Popt, to the real-valued domain using the following mapping
T Qˆ =
Re(Qˆ) −Im(Qˆ)
Im
(
Qˆ
)
Re
(
Qˆ
)  , T gk = [Re (gk)Im (gk)
]
, ∀k,
T Wˆ i =
Re(Wˆ i) −Im(Wˆ i)
Im
(
Wˆ i
)
Re
(
Wˆ i
)  , T hi = [Re (hi)Im (hi)
]
,
∀i, T 1N = 12N , T 0 = 02×1 in C5 and C6. (47)
Considering the standard SDP formulation (46) in the real-
valued domain, we use the method in chapter 6 in [32] to
calculate the complexity of attaining an optimized objective
value within accuracy ǫ, Comp (Popt, ǫ), in terms of the fol-
lowing parameters
no = dim xˆ+(M+1)N2 = (K+3)M+K+2(M+1)N2,
the dimension of real design variables; mo =
KM+2K+2M+4, the total number of LMI constraints which
includes: (KM +K +M + 3) LMI constraints each of size
(2N+2)× (2N+2), K LMI constraints each of size M×M
and (M+1) LMI constraints each of size N×N ; Data (Popt) =[
no, mo, cˆ
T , 4 vec (C1)
T
, 4 vec (C21)
T
, ...,
4 vec (C2K )
T
, 4 vec (C31)
T
, ..., 4 vec (C3M )
T
,
4 vec
(
C41,1
)T
, ..., 4 vec
(
C4M,K
)T
, 4 vec (C5)
T
,
4 vec (C6)
T
]T
.
The per-iteration complexity in terms of number of real
operations, Comp (Popt, ǫ), is calculated as [32]
Comp (Popt, ǫ) =√
(KM +K +M + 3)(2N + 2) +KM + (M + 1)N2
no
[
n2o + no
(
(KM +K +M + 3)(2N + 2)2 +KM2+
(M + 1)N2
)
+ (KM +K +M + 3)(2N + 2)3 +KM3+
(M + 1)N3
]
ln
(dim Data (Popt) + ‖Data (Popt)‖1 + ǫ2
ǫ
)
.
(48)
The solver can benefit from the structure of the LMI
matrices in the real-valued domain to reduce the
number of real operations. It can be seen that Psub
has an O
(
K
7
2M
7
2
[
ln(K2M) + ln( 1
ǫ
)
])
asymptotic1
complexity which is lower than that of the Popt,
O
(
K2M
3
2N8
[
ln(N2M) + ln( 1
ǫ
)
])
.
It should be mentioned that, for the suboptimal solution,
there is a pre-optimization processing for calculating {w¯i}
1The complexity as K,M,N →∞, ǫ→ 0+ and K ≤ N , M < N
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and {q¯1, q¯2}, the pre-optimization has an O
(
M3N
)
asymp-
totic complexity due to the SVD of M matrices of size
(M − 1) × N . Comparably, for the optimal solution, there
is a post-optimization processing for a rank reduction process
of ≤M Wˆ ⋆1i s. This post-processing is upper bounded by an
O (MN3) asymptotic complexity.
VIII. EVALUATIONS
In this section, we assess the performance of our proposed
schemes. The simulation parameters of our MISO SWIPT
system includes: number of transmit antennas N , number of
single-antenna IUs M , number of single-antenna IUs K, path-
loss (variance of the magnitude of channel coefficient) between
the transmit antenna, and the receive antenna at the IU and EH,
γ2I and γ2E , respectively, total transmit power budget available
at the BS, Pt, and energy harvesting efficiency ζ.
Parameter selection was made based on some practical
models and implementation requirements as follows:
• We set the restrictions N > M and N ≥ K. Having N >
M allows null space generation for the channel matrix
between the BS and the IUs, H , i.e., dim null(H) =
N × (N −M) does exist. Consequently, we can project
the AN in the null space of H . N ≥ K allows the EHs
to collude and cancel the interference from non-intended
IUs [34]. The selected values are N = 8, M = 2 and
K = 3.
• We assume that all IUs are at equal distances from the
BS and likewise for the EHs. This assumption is to avoid
the selection based on average path-loss which remains
static for a long time and focus on the optimization of the
beamforming matrices depending upon small-scale fading
coefficients.
• For selecting the values of γ2I and γ2E we rely on the
general urban channel model PLdB = 10 log10 rα + b
[35]. With path-loss coefficient α = 2, fixed-loss com-
ponent b = 10 dB which depends on the operating fre-
quency, height of transmit antennas and different macro-
environment type. The common assumption is that the
EHs are located closer to the BS compared to the IUs
in order to harvest energy. We assume that the IUs are
located at 1000 m apart from the BS and this corresponds
to 70dB path-loss and γ2I = 10−7, while the EHs are
located at 10 m from the BS and this corresponds to
30dB path-loss and γ2E = 10−3.
• Apart from the design of the energy harvesting circuit, the
energy harvesting efficiency mainly varies in accordance
with the range of incident RF power. With total transmit
power Pt = 1W and 30 dB average path-loss, the
incident RF power at the EHs is about 0 dBm which
yields an energy harvesting efficiency of at least 50%
[36]. Also, the parameter values Pt = 1 W and ζ = 0.5
give a decent feasibility region through which system
performance can be demonstrated.
We show the system performances in terms of the achiev-
able worst-case sum secrecy rates
(
R,Rsub(1), Rsub(2), Rsub(3)
)
against the total harvested energy constraint E¯ and individual
harvested energy constraint Eˆ. We call the area under the plot
(R-E curve) the R-E region and it shows the trade-off between
E¯ or Eˆ and the sum secrecy rate. The larger the R-E region
the better the performance.
Fig. 2 shows the R-E regions for the non-cooperative
EHs case. With regards to the optimal solution, it can be
seen that the worst-case sum secrecy rate decreases as the
required total harvested energy increases. The trade-off region
lies approximately over the total harvested energy constraint
interval (1.5, 7.3] mW. This means the power allocated to the
AN is zero when E¯ ≤ 1.5 mW , in other words, the energy
harvested from the information signal is enough to satisfy this
total harvested energy constraint. At the point corresponding
to, E¯ = 7.3 mW , the power allocated to the information
signal approaches zero and the problem is being reduced to the
energy harvesting maximization problem. On the other hand,
the sub-optimal solutions (achieved via LP optimization) have
a lower complexity than the optimal solution (achieved via
SDP optimization). The sub-optimal solutions’ performances
lie under the optimal solution. In the sub-optimal solution
achieved by the AN beamforming vector q1, Sub(1), there is a
gap in the total harvested energy between the optimal and the
sub-optimal solution, ∆E , at zero sum secrecy rate. This gap
which is equal to 38% of the optimal total harvested energy
(∆E7.4 × 100) is due to the nulling of the AN at the IUs. In
other words, in the optimal solution, the AN is matched to all
N transmit channels, while in the sub-optimal solution, some
degree of freedom of the AN beamforming vector is traded
for nullifying the AN at the IUs, therefore, the AN is matched
equivalently to only N −M (the column dimension of GV¯ )
channels. This issue of dimensionality reduction appears when
serving multiple IUs. The solution Sub(1) performs better over
the low total harvested energy constraint region, where the gap
between the optimal and the sub-optimal sum secrecy rates,
∆R, at zero harvested energy constraint is equal to 13% of the
optimal sum secrecy rate ( ∆R3.85 ×100). Conversely, in the sub-
optimal solution Sub(2), all N channel coefficients of q2 are
matched to the dominant eigenvector of GHG, therefore, the
maximum energy is harvested at zero secrecy rate, and the gap
in the total harvested energy between the optimal and the sub-
optimal solutions totally vanishes. In the sub-optimal solution
Sub(3), better performance is achieved by exploiting both AN
beamforming vectors q1 and q2, the achievable sum secrecy
rate of the sub-optimal solution Sub(3) exploits the advantage
of the good performance of Sub(1) and Sub(2) over different
regions of E¯. It can be seen that Rsub(3) traces the envelope
of Rsub(1) and Rsub(2), i.e., Rsub(3) = max
(
Rsub(1), Rsub(2)
)
.
Fig. 3 shows the E-R region when the EHs cooperate to
wire-tap an individual IUs. The same observations in Fig. 2
for the non-cooperative EHs are valid for the cooperative EHs
case.
Fig. 4 shows the E-R regions for the non-cooperative EHs
case but with individual harvested energy constraints for
the optimal and Sub(3) (achieved by solving P¯ (3) in (21))
solutions. The achievable worst-case sum secrecy rate with
respect to Eˆ follows a similar trend to that with respect to
E¯ given in Fig. 2. By comparing the results in Fig. 4 and
Fig. 2, we notice that the achievable worst-case sum secrecy
rates corresponding to Eˆ = 0 and E¯ = 0 are equal since both
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problems (14) and (15) are equivalent to a worst-case sum
secrecy rate maximization problems with no harvested energy
constraints. The Sub(3) solution achieves zero worst-case sum
secrecy rates at a value of Eˆ = 1.5 mW which is lower
than the value of the optimal solution, Eˆ = 2.2 mW . This is
because in the Sub(3) solution the AN beamforming vectors,
q1 and q2, are designed to maximize the total harvested energy
while the problem is constrained with the individual harvested
energy of the EHs.
For the given system parameters and the considered cases,
cooperative and non-cooperative EHs represent the worse-case
and the best-case assumptions, respectively. The cooperative
EHs are equivalent to a single receiver with K receive antenna.
Now, with the restriction K ≤ N , the best scenario for the
EHs is to employ successive interference cancellation which is
capable of cancelling the interference from non-intended IUs
and achieves the best possible information rate [34]. Therefore,
the achievable sum secrecy rate can be considered as a lower
bound on the optimal solution1 performance. In the other case,
non-cooperative EHs, the assumption is that each EH relies
on itself to decode the intended IU signal. In addition, in our
objective in (8), we optimize the worst-case sum secrecy rate,
i.e., the case when the IUi are being eavesdropped by the
strongest EHk (see the max operator term in (8)). Therefore,
the achievable sum secrecy rate can be considered as an upper
bound on the optimal solution performance.
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Fig. 2. E-R regions for the non-cooperative EHs case with
total harvested energy constraint.
Fig. 5 shows the effect of the placement of the IUs and the
non-cooperative EHs on the achievable average sum secrecy
rate for system parameters N = 8, K = 3, M = 2,
E¯ = 2 mW , Pt = 1 W and ζ = 0.5. For that purpose, the
statistical average of the channel power gains (channel vari-
ance) from the BS to all EHs are kept constant at γ2E = 10−3,
therefore, the problem feasibility will not be affected, while
channel variance from the BS to all IUs is varied over the range
1This is the lower bound on the optimal solution performance since the
suboptimal solution performances still lie under this lower bound.
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Fig. 3. E-R regions for cooperative EHs case with total
harvested energy constraint.
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Fig. 4. E-R regions for the non-cooperative EHs case with
individual harvested energy constraints.
[−90dB,−50dB] which corresponds to channel variance range
from γ2I = 10−9 to γ2I = 10−5. As expected, the average sum
secrecy rate tends to decrease as the IUs signal attenuation
increases.
Fig. 6 compares the average worst-case sum secrecy rate
achieved by different optimization schemes against different
number of transmit antennas at the BS with K = 3, M = 2,
E¯ = 3 mW , Pt = 1 W and ζ = 0.5. The value of E¯ is
chosen such that the three solutions, the optimal, Sub(1) and
Sub(2) get a reasonable feasibility rate. Note that to calculate
the average sum secrecy rate, only the feasible solution cases
are considered. As expected at lower value of harvested energy
constraint (E¯ = 3 mW ), the suboptimal solution Sub(1)
outperforms Sub(2). The priority in AN precoding in Sub(1)
is to nullify the AN at the IUs and this is appropriate at low
harvested energy constraint region. It can be seen that the gap
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given harvested energy constraint E¯ = 2mW .
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Fig. 6. Achievable average sum secrecy rate for different
numbers of transmit antennas.
between the average sum secrecy rate achieved by Sub(1) and
Sub(2) increases with the number antennas. This is because,
in Sub(1), as the number of transmit antennas increases, the
percentage of channels used to match the AN signal toward the
EHs increases with preserving the cancellation of the AN at the
IUs. For example, at N = 10, equivalently, 80%
(
10−2
10 × 100
)
of the transmit antennas are used for AN alignment, whereas
at N = 25, 92%
(
25−2
25 × 100
)
of the transmit antennas are
used for AN alignment.
The feasibility of the optimal solution to problem (14) is
mainly dependent on the parameters in the feasibility condition
(11). In addition, the choice of the initial values of the slack
variable vectors s¯ and v¯ can affect the feasibility of the
first iteration. If the initial values of s¯ and v¯ are chosen far
from the optimal values s⋆ and v⋆, then there is a strong
possibility that the first iteration ends up infeasible or the
solution takes a large number of iterations to converge. In Fig.
7, we examine the feasibility rate of the optimal solution in
average percentage for a range of harvested energy constraint
using the same simulation parameters in Fig. 2. A simple
and good approximation for the initial values s¯ and v¯ are
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Fig. 7. Optimal solution feasibility rate in percentage.
calculated as follows
v¯k =log
(
Pt − Pn
M
M∑
i=1
Tr
(
Gkw¯mw¯
H
m
)
+
Pn
2
2∑
l=1
Tr
(
Gkq¯lq¯
H
l
)
+ σ2E
)
, ∀i, (49)
s¯i = log
(
Pn
2
∣∣∣hHi q¯2∣∣∣2 + σ2I) , ∀i, (50)
where Pn is the total AN power. The values obtained by the
above equations are based on the third suboptimal solution
Sub(3), but with equal power allocation among the informa-
tion beamforming vectors and the AN beamforming vectors.
The initial values that yield a feasible first iteration (if it exists)
is obtained via one-dimensional search across 0 ≤ Pn ≤ Pt.
The optimal solution feasibility rate in percentage is calculated
using three different Monté-Carlo simulations. In the first
two simulations, we inspect the actual optimization problem
feasibility by solving problem (14) using CVX software.
The initial values s¯ and v¯ are calculated by using (49) and
(50) with a search through Pn = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 W for the
first simulation (square-marked curve), and for the second
simulation results (star-marked curve), the initial values are
calculated by (49) and (50) but only with Pn = 0. These two
results are compared with problem feasibility rate obtained
by the satisfaction of the condition in (11) (solid line curve).
As we can see, searching through four different initial values
of s¯ and v¯ yields a feasibility rate close to that obtained by
feasibility condition (11), while when each of s¯ and v¯ are
assigned one value, the feasibility rate drops significantly. This
gives an insight into the sharpness of the feasibility condition
(11).
Fig. 8 shows the achievable worst-case sum secrecy rate
across the iterations of our iterative algorithms for both optimal
solution and the sub-optimal solution, Sub(3). The results
are obtained in the trade-off region of both solutions with
a common total harvested energy constraint E¯ = 5.5 mW
and common initial values, s¯ and v¯, which are calculated by
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Fig. 8. Convergence of the achievable sum secrecy rate for
the optimal and Sub(3) solutions, with non-cooperative EHs.
using (50) and (49) with Pn = 0.2, 0.5 W . With a tolerance
of 0.001 b/s/Hz, the optimal solution converges at the 10th
and the 7th iterations with the initial values generated with
Pn = 0.2 W and Pn = 0.5 W , respectively. On the other
hand, the sub-optimal solution converges at the 5th and the 4th
iterations with the initial values generated with Pn = 0.2 W
and Pn = 0.5 W , respectively. The suboptimal solution
shows a faster convergence speed than the optimal solution
at different initial values. This is expected since the initial
values are calculated by the beamforming vectors employed
by the suboptimal solution.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered secure downlink transmission
in SWIPT MU-MISO systems comprising multiple IUs and
multiple EHs which have the potential to wire-tap the IU’s
signal. We proposed joint optimization of the information
and AN beamforming vectors for worst-case sum secrecy rate
maximization with a constraint on the total harvested energy
by the EHs. The problem was formulated as an iterative
SDP program. Using dual variable multipliers, we derived
a rank-one solution for the transmit covariance matrices of
the IUs which achieved the same optimal sum secrecy rate
attained by a rank-unconstrained SDP program solution. Three
different sub-optimal solutions were also provided. The first
solution was based on IUs interference alignment and the
projection of the AN in the null space of IUs channel vectors
followed by transmission along the dominant eigenvector of
the equivalent EHs channel, while the second solution ignored
the AN alignment at the IUs. The third sub-optimal solution
exploited the AN beamforming vectors of both the first and the
second sub-optimal solutions. The performances of the sub-
optimal solutions lied under the optimal solution, however,
as a result of AN null space projection, the first sub-optimal
solution outperformed the second solution in the low energy
harvesting constraint region and vice versa for the high energy
harvesting constraint region. The sum secrecy rate achieved by
the third sub-optimal solution traced the maximum of the first
or the second sub-optimal solution. Future work will aim at
optimizing transmit beamforming matrices for multi-antenna
IUs and EHs, and also considering the work for the massive
MU-MISO case.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM I
Proof: For the SDR problems (14), the optimal rank-
one solution S˜⋆1 is obtained via two steps. In the first
step, we find the structure of the optimal rank-unconstrained
information beamforming matrices
{
Wˆ
⋆1
m
}
. Then, in the
second step, we use the structure of
{
Wˆ
⋆1
m
}
to calculate
new optimal solution
{{
W˜
⋆1
m
}
, Q˜
⋆1
, s˜⋆1 , T˜
⋆1
,u⋆1 ,v⋆1
}
=
S˜⋆1 that satisfies a rank-one constraint, rank
(
W˜
⋆1
m¯
)
=
1, and achieves the same objective value achieved by{{
Wˆ
⋆1
m
}
, Qˆ
⋆1
, s⋆1 ,T ⋆1 ,u⋆1 ,v⋆1
}
= S⋆1 . The optimal
rank-one solution of (15), S˜⋆2 , can be obtained by following
the same steps, therefore, and due to space limitation, we
provide the proof for (14) only.
Since the objective function and the constraints of (13) are
differentiable, i. e., they have an open domain, then there is a
solution set that can strictly satisfy the constraints (13a)-(13e).
Therefore, Slater’s condition holds, and zero gap between
primal and dual solutions is guaranteed if the KKT conditions
are satisfied [26]. The Lagrangian of problem (13) can be
written as
L (S,L) =
M∑
i=1
(
ui − si − vk(i) + ti,k(i)
)
+
M∑
i=1
(
−α3ieui + α4iesi −
K∑
k=1
α6i,ke
ti,k
)
+
K∑
k=1
α5ke
vk
+
M∑
m=1
Tr
(
AmWˆm
)
+ Tr
(
BQˆ
)
+ d, (51)
where
Am = −α1 + ζα2Gˆ+
M∑
i=1
α3iHi −
K∑
k=1
α5kGˆk
+
M∑
i=1
i6=m
(
−α4iHi +
K∑
k=1
α6i,kGˆk
)
+ Y m, (52)
B = −α1 + ζα2Gˆ−
K∑
k=1
α5kGˆk
+
M∑
i=1
(
α3iHi − α4iHi +
K∑
k=1
α6i,kGˆk
)
+ Y Q,
(53)
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d =α1Pt − α2E¯ +
M∑
i=1
(
(α3i − α4i)σ2I + σ2E
K∑
k=1
α6i,k
)
− σ2E
K∑
k=1
α5k , (54)
and
{
α1, α2, {α3i} , {α4i} , {α5k} ,
{
α6i,k
}}
= L ≥ 0 are
the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints (8a),
(8b), (13a), (13b), (13c) and (13d), respectively. The set
{Y m} ,Y Q  0 are the Lagrange multipliers associated
with the semidefiniteness constraints in (8c), respectively, and
k(i) = argmax
k
(vk − ti,k). Notice that, the Lagrange dual
function G (L, {Y m} ,Y Q) is the supremum of L over S.
In order for G to exist, G has to be bounded from above,
accordingly
Am,B  0, {α4i} , {α5k} ,
{
α6i,k | k 6= k(i)
}
= 0,
and {α3i} ,
{
α6i,k(i)
}
> 0. (55)
Therefore, the Lagrangian function will be
G =α1Pt − α2E¯ +
M∑
i=1
(
α3iσ
2
I + α6i,k(i)σ
2
E
)
+
M∑
i=1
(
log
(
1
α3iα6i,k(i)
)
− 2
)
. (56)
The primal problem (13) can be solved by solving the dual
problem (57) which achieves the same objective value
Minimize
L,{Y m},Y Q
G
subject to
α1, α2 ≥ 0, {α3i} ,
{
α6k(i)
}
> 0, {Y m} ,Y Q  0. (57)
We prove that the KKT conditions for the relaxed primal
variable
{
Wˆm
}
are satisfied as follows:
1) Primal and Dual Feasibility: Based on the feasibility
condition in (11) and the non-negativeness of dual variables,
both primal and dual problems are feasible.
2) Complementary Slackness: Since Slater’s condition
holds, then
f (S⋆1)
= G
(
L⋆1 , {Y ⋆1m} , Y ⋆1Q
)
= sup
S
L
(
S,L⋆1 , {Y ⋆1m} , Y ⋆1Q
)
= sup
S
[
f (S) + α⋆11 h1 + α
⋆1
2 h2 +
M∑
i=1
(
α⋆13i h3i + α
⋆1
4i
h4i+
K∑
k=1
α⋆16i,kh6i,k + Tr
(
Y ⋆1i Wˆ i
))
+
K∑
k=1
α⋆15kh5k+
Tr
(
Y ⋆1Q Qˆ
)]
(a)
≥ f (S⋆1) + α⋆11 h⋆11 + α⋆12 h⋆12 +
M∑
i=1
(
α⋆13i h
⋆1
3i
+ α⋆14i h
⋆1
4i
+
K∑
k=1
α⋆16i,kh
⋆1
6i,k
+ Tr
(
Y ⋆1i Wˆ
⋆1
i
))
+
K∑
k=1
α⋆15kh
⋆1
5k
+
Tr
(
Y ⋆1Q Qˆ
⋆1
)
(b)
≥ f (S⋆1) , (58)
where f is the primal objective function,
{
L⋆1 , {Y ⋆1m} ,Y ⋆1Q
}
is the optimal solution of (57) and h1, h2, {h3i}, {h4i},
{h5k} and
{
h6i,k
}
are the left-hand side of the inequal-
ity constraints (8a), (8b) and (13a)-(13d) (after rewriting
them as ≥ 0 inequalities), respectively. The inequality (a)
follows since the supremum of the Lagrangian is greater
than or equal to the value of the Lagrangian at any fea-
sible set of {S,L⋆1} which includes {S⋆1 ,L⋆1} [26]. The
inequality (b) follows from the non-negativeness of the ele-
ments in α⋆11 h
⋆1
1 , α
⋆1
2 h
⋆1
2 ,
{
α⋆13i h
⋆1
3i
}
,
{
α⋆14i h
⋆1
4i
}
,
{
α⋆15kh
⋆1
5k
}
,{
α⋆16i,kh
⋆1
6i,k
}
,
{
Tr
(
Y ⋆1i Wˆ
⋆1
i
)}
, and Tr
(
Y ⋆1Q Qˆ
⋆1
)
. There-
fore, the inequalities (a) and (b) hold only when each
term in α⋆11 h
⋆1
1 , α
⋆1
2 h
⋆1
2 ,
{
α⋆13i h
⋆1
3i
}
,
{
α⋆14i h
⋆1
4i
}
,
{
α⋆15kh
⋆1
5k
}
,{
α⋆16i,kh
⋆1
6i,k
}
,
{
Tr
(
Y ⋆1i Wˆ
⋆1
i
)}
, and Tr
(
Y ⋆1Q Qˆ
⋆1
)
is equal
to zero. Hence, the complimentary slackness is proved.
3) Stationarity: The stationary point of L should satisfy
M∑
m=1
∂L
∂Wˆ
⋆1
m
= 0, therefore
M∑
m=1
A⋆1m = 0.
Since we have A⋆1m  0, ∀m, then, based on stationarity,
(52) and (55), we have
Y ⋆1m =D
⋆1
m −
M∑
i=1
α⋆13iHi, ∀m, (59)
D
⋆1
m = α
⋆1
1 − ζα
⋆1
2 Gˆ−
M∑
i=1
i6=m
α⋆16i,k(i)Gˆk(i). (60)
To satisfy the complementary slackness condition, W
⋆1
m
should lie in the null space of Y
⋆1
m . Define rank
(
Y
⋆1
m
)
= r1m ,
rank
(
D
⋆1
m
)
= r2m , null
(
Y
⋆1
m
)
= Ωm ∈ CN×(N−r1m )
and null
(
D
⋆1
m
)
= Ψm =
[
ψm,1, ...,ψm,N−r2m
]
∈
CN×(N−r2m ). Let ψm,n be the nth column of Ψm. Then we
have
ψHm,nY
⋆1
mψm,n = ψ
H
m,n
(
D
⋆1
m −
M∑
i=1
α
⋆1
3iHi
)
ψm,n =
−ψHm,n
(
M∑
i=1
α
⋆1
3iHi
)
ψm,n = −
M∑
i=1
α
⋆1
3i
∣∣∣hHi ψm,n∣∣∣2 .
(61)
Since Y
⋆1
m  0, Hi  0 and
{
α
⋆1
3i
}
> 0, hence(
M∑
i=1
α
⋆1
3iHi
)
Ψm = 0. (62)
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Accordingly, the column vectors in Ψm are in the null
space of Y
⋆1
m , therefore, Ψm is a sub-matrix of Ωm and the
inequality rank (Ψm) ≤ rank (Ωm) is always true.
The N × N positive semidefinite matrix Y ⋆1m satisfies the
following
rank (Ωm) = N − rank
(
Y
⋆1
m
)
. (63)
Since
{
α
⋆1
3i
}
> 0, and {Hi}  0 are statistically inde-
pendent rank-one matrices, then
∑M
i=1 α
⋆1
3iHi is a positive
semidefinite matrix of a rank ≤M (most likely equal to M ).
Therefore, by applying the result of Lemma A.1 in [6] to (59),
we have, rank
(
Y
⋆1
m
)
≥ rank
(
D
⋆1
m
)
−M . Substituting this
inequality in (63) results in
rank (Ωm) ≤ N − rank
(
D
⋆1
m
)
+M
≤ rank (Ψm) +M. (64)
Therefore,
rank (Ψm) ≤ rank (Ωm) ≤ rank (Ψm) +M. (65)
Now, let us consider the case, rank (Ωm) = rank (Ψm),
i.e., Ωm = Ψm and W
⋆1
m = am,nψm,nψ
H
m,n, am,n > 0.
This solution can not be optimal since it leads to a negative
secrecy rate at the IUm along with inter-user interference,
moreover, the noise imposed by W
⋆1
m on the EHs can be
attained by the AN beamformers qls which are statistically
independent, and therefore, W
⋆1
m = 0 will definitely per-
form better. As a result, the case rank (Ωm) = rank (Ψm)
does not exist and there are always between 1 and M
unit norm vector(s) [ωm,1, ...,ωm,r2m−r1m ] which satisfy
Ωm =
[
Ψm
[
ωm,1, ...,ωm,r2m−r1m
]]
. Then, we can write
the optimal solution for Wˆ
⋆1
m ∈
{
Wˆ
⋆1
m¯
}
as
N−r2m∑
n=1
am,nψm,nψ
H
m,n +
r2m−r1m∑
n1=1
bm,n1ωm,n1ω
H
m,n1
, (66)
where bm,n1s > 0 are positive scaling constants.
In the following, we can construct a non-unique optimal
solution S˜⋆1 that satisfies rank
(
W˜
⋆1
m
)
= 1 and can achieve
the same objective value achieved by Wˆ ⋆1m as follows
W˜
⋆1
m = bm,n¯1mωm,n¯mω
H
m,n¯m
=
{
Wˆ
⋆1
m − τm ∀m ∈ {m¯}
Wˆ
⋆1
m , ∀m /∈ {m¯}
,
(67)
s˜⋆1m =
s⋆1m + δ
(1)
m , ∀m ∈ {m¯} , Tr (Hmτm) ≤ Tr
(
Gk(m)τm
)
s⋆1m + δ
(2)
m , ∀m ∈ {m¯} , Tr (Hmτm) ≥ Tr
(
Gk(m)τm
)
s⋆1m , ∀m /∈ {m¯} ,
(68)
t˜⋆1
m,k(m) =

t⋆1
m,k(m) + δ
(1)
m , ∀m ∈ {m¯} ,Tr (Hmτm) ≤ Tr
(
Gk(m)τm
)
t⋆1
m,k(m) + δ
(2)
m , ∀m ∈ {m¯} ,Tr (Hmτm) ≥ Tr
(
Gk(m)τm
)
t⋆1
m,k(m), ∀m /∈ {m¯} ,
(69)
and
Q˜
⋆1
= Qˆ
⋆1
+
∑
m∈{m¯}
τm, (70)
where
n¯m ∈ {1, ..., r2m − r1m} , (71)
τm =
N−r2m∑
n=1
am,nψm,nψ
H
m,n +
N−rm∑
n1=1
n1 6=n¯1m
bm,n1ωm,n1ω
H
m,n1
,
(72)
δ(1)m = −s⋆1m + log
(
Tr (Hmτm) + es
⋆
m
)
, (73)
δ(2)m = −t⋆1m,k(m) + log
(
Tr
(
Gk(m)τm
)
+ et
⋆
m,k(m)
)
. (74)
By substituting S˜⋆1 into the constraints and the objective
function of problem (13), it can be verified that S˜⋆1 satisfies all
the constraints (13a)-(13e) and achieves the same sum secrecy
rate as S⋆1 does. This concludes the proof.
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